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and thereby dispel concerns about 
a “big brother syndrome” (fadtr
2003, 156, 158). The current govern-
ment was criticized for its inattention
to the region and its disregard for
cultivating relations with Pacific
leaders. In this respect Howard’s
absences from the Forum early in his
tenure were noted. Overall the report
reflected a perceived need for greater
engagement with the region on the
part of Australian ministers and
parliamentarians.
Australia’s policy of processing
asylum seekers in the microstates,
otherwise known as the Pacific Solu-
tion, also came under fire (see von
Strokirch 2002). It was argued that
this policy “feeds the perception
within the region that Australia’s
domestic political considerations 
are more important than broader
regional issues” (fadtr 2003, xxvii).
Questions were also raised about the
strategy’s lack of transparency, its
effect on political stability, and its
long-term social impact (fadtr
2003, xxvii). The committee recom-
mended that the policy be terminated.
Another example of Australia’s
apparently uncaring attitude toward
its neighbors was its refusal to coun-
tenance Tuvalu’s request to consider
accepting environmental refugees as 
a result of rising sea levels associated
with climate change. The committee
suggested that Australia give assur-
ances to Tuvalu that assistance 
would be forthcoming (fadtr
2003, 170).
This year’s review focuses on Austral-
ian policy toward the Pacific Islands,
as there were important develop-
ments concerning Canberra’s role in
regional security and in the Pacific
Islands Forum. Because Australia is
the region’s primary aid donor and
leads in setting the political agenda,
shifts in its national policy warrant
careful consideration. In 2003 Aus-
tralian Prime Minister John Howard
took unprecedented interest in the
region. He became much more
assertive in pursuing Australia’s
agenda for the microstates, notably
with regard to intervening in Solo-
mon Islands, advocating good gover-
nance, and taking measures against
terrorism. This review explores the
shifts in rhetoric, policy, and pro-
cesses, and weighs their impact for
Australia’s relations with the region.
To establish the context for policy
shifts, it is useful to begin by examin-
ing a recent, wide-ranging, and timely
report on relations with the region by
an Australian Senate committee.
In August 2003, the Foreign
Affairs, Defence, and Trade Refer-
ences Committee produced a com-
prehensive 312-page report on Aus-
tralia’s relations with the region. The
committee reviewed the performance
of past policies, made recommenda-
tions for improvements in current
practices, and proposed innovations.
In the political domain, the commit-
tee repeatedly alluded to the need for
Australia to relate to the region on
the basis of an “equal partnership”
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In the economic domain, the Sen-
ate committee made several practical
recommendations including reduction
of non-tariff barriers to regional
trade; a long-term plan for regional
cooperation to promote tourism; 
and a pilot program allowing Pacific
Islanders to undertake seasonal work
in Australia. With regard to good gov-
ernance and development policy, the
committee emphasized that Australia
must be better informed about coun-
try-specific culture and politics in
order to tailor policies accordingly.
Indeed, the report set an example by
devoting a substantial section to coun-
try case studies. The need for local
consultation and participation in aid
planning and delivery was stressed.
The tendency for Australian aid to 
be crisis driven was also criticized 
for distorting and skewing priorities.
Aid should not be diverted from
long-term development strategies to
address periodic crises; instead, an
emergency fund should be set up for
this purpose. The committee noted
Australia’s preoccupation with reform
of central governments in the Pacific.
It observed that this was occurring 
at the expense of equally important
rural development programs (fadtr
2003, xv–xxi).
The Senate committee believed that
many of the weaknesses in the rela-
tionship stemmed from widespread
ignorance and lack of interest in the
Pacific Islands on the part of Austral-
ians (including politicians and media)
and an overall neglect of bilateral,
people-to-people links. The commit-
tee recommended the establishment 
of an Australia-Pacific Council to
enhance awareness, interaction, and
understanding between Australia and
the region. The functions of such a
council could include promotion of
visits and exchanges; institutional
links in the areas of politics, culture,
commerce, and media; and Pacific
studies in Australian schools and
universities. The committee also sug-
gested the development of stronger
people-to-people links by drawing
more on the expertise of Australian
volunteers, businesses, public service
departments, and Parliament (fadtr
2003, xxix–xxx).
While most of the Senate report’s
analyses and recommendations were
constructive and worthy of considera-
tion, there were deficiencies. For
instance, the committee deliberately
omitted discussion of the situation in
West Papua, instead forwarding the
matter to a Senate enquiry on Indo-
nesia. The omission was ill advised in
view of West Papua’s historical associ-
ation with the other Pacific Islands
and the serious concerns of many
Forum leaders over human rights and
self-determination in the territory. It
was also inconsistent, as two other
dependencies, New Caledonia and the
Northern Marianas, were included in
the report’s terms of reference. Also,
although the committee acknowl-
edged communal land rights as sig-
nificant in Pacific Island society and
approaches to development, the
report treated this topic only super-
ficially and ultimately relegated it to
the “too difficult” basket, without
making any recommendations. This
failure to grapple with a sensitive
topic was unfortunate, given the
prominent role of land rights disputes
in regional conflicts. While the com-
mittee advocated that conceptions of
good governance must be adapted to
political and cultural contexts, there
was no parallel consideration of the
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merits or shortcomings of western
economic models for microstates.
The most radical recommendation
of the Senate report was a proposal
for a formal Pacific Economic and
Political Community, along the lines
of the European Union. The commit-
tee envisaged this including a com-
mon currency (the Australian dollar),
labor market, standards for demo-
cratic governance, and fiscal and legal
policies, as well as shared defense and
security arrangements. The report
recommended establishing a group of
eminent persons, with experts drawn
from all the Forum member countries,
to explore the scope and feasibility of
this concept. The group would tour
the region and meet with governments
to ascertain support for the idea
(fadtr 2003, xiii). In fielding this
proposal, the committee could have
given greater recognition to the fact
that the Forum and associated agen-
cies are already pursuing regional
cooperation in many areas. There is
scope to broaden and deepen existing
cooperation before proceeding to a
formal union. Indeed, there is likely
to be resistance to a formal union,
especially among Melanesian states,
due to sensitivities about sovereignty
and perceptions of neocolonial
motives on Australia’s part. As a
result, the Senate’s proposal is unlikely
to even be considered in the foresee-
able future.
Concerns about neocolonialism are
genuine for Pacific Island microstates
as they seek to protect their sover-
eignty. These are relatively young
states, having obtained independence
in the last major wave of decoloniza-
tion in the 1970s and 1980s. Older
generations thus have a living mem-
ory of colonialism. In most cases the
colonial experience in the Pacific was
not as exploitative or painful as else-
where. Nevertheless, colonial powers
still exercised absolute control over
Pacific dependencies. These nations
are also aware that many challenges
they face today are rooted in colonial-
ism. For example, arbitrary national
boundaries, patterns of migration,
privatisation of land, poorly planned
exploitation of natural resources, and
lack of preparation for independence
all planted the seeds for contemporary
tensions and conflicts. In view of his-
torical experience, it is not unreason-
able for Pacific Island leaders to be
sceptical, and at times resistant, to 
the imposition of externally generated
policy agendas.
Conservative Australian policy-
makers and commentators on Pacific
Island affairs, including the current
prime minister, have largely displayed
indifference to such historic legacies
and resulting Island concerns. Instead
they blame microstates for their cur-
rent problems and assert that Austra-
lia has a right, if not a duty, to call
the shots and impose radical policies
for reform on the microstates. The
effective collapse of the Solomon
Islands state added grist to the mill of
conservatives seeking much tougher
conditions on aid, or a cessation of
aid altogether (Hughes 2003). The
Australian prime minister did not
agree with the notion of cutting aid 
to the Pacific. Yet the tone of public
debate following the Solomon Islands
intervention enabled Howard to 
drum up domestic support and wear
down Islander opposition to his new
“hands-on” approach and agenda for
the region. To this end he joined
forces with the mainstream media 
in evoking doomsday visions of the
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Pacific Islands: “We’re in an era now
where these countries are just going
to disappear in chaos and ill-gover-
nance if we don’t intervene” (The
Australian, 13 Aug 2003).
As noted by the Senate committee,
the Australian media is, with a few
notable exceptions, woefully ill
informed about the Pacific. As a
result, representations of the Pacific
Islands are riddled with references to
the arc of instability, coups and ethnic
conflict, failed states, crime, and law-
lessness. Even Greg Sheridan, the for-
eign affairs editor of the national
daily, engaged in inaccurate and
alarmist generalizations about the
region: “While the Solomons is the
worst case . . . the whole region is suf-
fering from similar problems. . . . The
South Pacific has among the worst
development records in the world”
(The Australian, 7–8 Jun 2003). In
fact, these extreme problems are lim-
ited to the subregion of Melanesia,
notably in recent times to Solomon
Islands and Papua New Guinea. While
Fiji and Vanuatu have experienced
coups or violent challenges to elected
government in the past, they are cur-
rently stable. The remaining micro-
states in Polynesia and Micronesia
have for the most part enjoyed levels
of peace, stability, democracy, and
respect for human rights unknown in
much of the developing world. There
is thus much cause for resentment at
the revival of the discourse of doom-
saying and belittlement of the Pacific
Islands.
This perspective is not new and
was most associated with the Austral-
ian National University’s Pacific 2010
research project in the early 1990s.
However, its origins date back to
colonial-era attitudes of superiority
toward the Pacific. The discourse
generalizes on the basis of worst-case
scenarios while ignoring achievements
in national development and regional
cooperation. It also fails to acknowl-
edge the scope for indigenous creativ-
ity in coming up with solutions and
assumes that these can only come
from the outside. This discourse has
been comprehensively criticized and
discredited by scholars such as Greg
Fry and Epeli Hau‘ofa, not to mention
a host of nongovernment agencies. It
is unfortunate that the Australian
prime minister appears to have
adopted this perspective and accom-
panying rhetoric, with damaging
consequences for Australia’s relations
with the region.
A brief report by Australia’s official
overseas aid agency, AusAID, pro-
vided a welcome corrective to public
commentary on the Pacific, which it
summed up as “simplistic” and lack-
ing in objectivity (AusAID 2003, ii)
The report took issue with three key
misrepresentations of the Pacific by
the media, namely that: “since inde-
pendence development has gone back-
wards; corruption, poor leadership
and lawlessness are endemic, and aid
has failed and has promoted rent seek-
ing and fiscal indiscipline” (AusAID
2003, 1). Instead, it argued, “The
region is confronted with significant
challenges and seemingly intractable
problems. But it is not homogenous
and there are strong examples of
where countries have had success that
need to be considered alongside fail-
ures. There have been substantial
improvements in social indicators,
particularly life expectancy. . . . Cor-
ruption and weak adherence to the
rule of law are significant problems.
But poor economic and financial
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management, again stemming from
weak capacity, is arguably a greater
source of wastage and inappropriate
use of resources” (AusAID 2003, ii).
The Pacific Islands are painfully
aware of their dependence on aid,
notably from Australia, and of their
obligation to submit to reasonable
conditions on such aid. However, 
the extent of their dependence makes
them even more inclined to resist per-
ceived acts of neocolonialism, whether
these be substantive or symbolic in
nature. Prime Minister Howard made
the claim that the concept of neocolo-
nialism is no longer relevant in Aus-
tralia’s relationship with the Pacific
Islands: “Neo-colonial is old jargon.
We’ve passed through that” (The Aus-
tralian, 13 Aug 2003). This attitude is
dangerously dismissive of genuine
Islander concerns. The need for sensi-
tivity on this score was emphasized in
the Senate committee’s report and by
another analyst advocating the Solo-
mon Islands intervention: “Any policy
approach to the problems of the
Southwest Pacific must avoid the
perils and mistakes of neo-colonial-
ism” (aspi 2003, 9). 
Notwithstanding regional ambiva-
lence toward Australia, its involve-
ment is clearly desired, and arguably
indispensable, as the major aid donor
to individual states and also for the
diplomatic energy and resources it
contributes to regional organizations.
The microstates positively encourage
Australia’s continuing engagement
with the region, albeit with abiding
concerns about the need for balance
and mutual respect in the relation-
ship. In recognition of Australia’s
central role in regional affairs, Pacific
leaders cautiously welcomed the new
level of commitment to the region evi-
dent in Howard’s rhetoric and policy
in 2003. The substance of Australian
engagement has been evident in sev-
eral significant ways: leading the Solo-
mon Islands intervention, prime min-
isterial involvement in the Forum,
funding of initiatives in regional coop-
eration, an invigorated campaign to
tackle corruption, and a series of
measures to counter terrorism.
Australia’s response to Solomon
Islands Prime Minister Kemakeza’s
request in April 2003 for an interven-
tion force in his country cannot be
faulted in terms of legitimating the
exercise and thus removing grounds
for charges of neocolonialism. The
Australian government went to great
lengths to ensure that this new form
of “cooperative intervention” was
properly authorized. First it obtained
endorsement by the Pacific Islands
Forum Foreign Ministers on 30 June,
thus activating the Forum’s year 2000
Biketawa declaration on regional
security. Thereafter came a formal
invitation from the Solomon Islands
governor-general on 4 July and unani-
mous passage of enabling legislation
in the Solomon Islands Parliament on
11 July (Howard 2003). The exercise
was further legitimated by support
from the secretaries-general of both
the United Nations and the Common-
wealth. The Regional Assistance
Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi)
also avoided the appearance of unilat-
eral action on Australia’s part, as it
included personnel from Fiji, New
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and
Tonga.
The Regional Assistance Mission,
otherwise known in Pidgin as Opera-
tion Helpem Fren, was duly deployed
in late July. The operation was judged
a great success in gaining overwhelm-
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ing community support and an imme-
diate improvement in law and order,
notably with the removal of 3,000
weapons in the first three weeks. Key
individuals involved in perpetrating
violent crimes were apprehended.
Australia contributed approximately
1,500 defence personnel, over 200
federal police and protective services
personnel, as well as officials from
government departments to assist in
reform of the public service. The
operation is costing Australia an esti-
mated a$200 million in the first year
(Howard 2003). However, concerns
have been expressed by nongovern-
ment organizations over the narrow-
ness of “ramsi’s stated focus on law
and justice problems, the shortcom-
ings of public institutions and eco-
nomic imperatives” (Oxfam 2003, i).
The intervention runs the risk of
neglecting long-term causes of conflict
relating to internal displacement and
migration, land rights, alienated
youth, uneven development, and
poverty. Arguably, the same charge
could be leveled at Australia’s current
policy priorities in the Pacific Islands
as a whole.
Australia and the Forum have also
been criticized for not acting sooner in
Solomon Islands. Australia was asked
to intervene in Solomon Islands in
April 2000, before the June coup that
ousted the elected government. This
request was legitimate as it was made
by the Solomon Islands prime minis-
ter with bipartisan support (Kerr
2003). But at that time Australia
refused to countenance direct inter-
vention, as did the secretary-general
of the Forum. Instead, Australia facili-
tated the Townsville Peace Agreement
in October 2000, which brought
about a tentative ceasefire and the
surrender of many weapons. How-
ever, the peace process stalled, mili-
tants retained many weapons, and
lawlessness continued. As a result the
Solomon Islands government, econ-
omy, and internal security suffered
massive damage, to the point of being
labeled a failed state. Experience else-
where in the world suggests that it is
cheaper and more effective to assist 
a weak state than to revive a failed
state (aspi 2003, 29). However, as
late as January 2003 Australian
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
stated that it would be “folly in the
extreme” for Australia to intervene 
in Solomon Islands, mainly because
“it would not work” even if it was
“dressed up” as a multilateral initia-
tive (The Australian, 3 Jan 2003).
The reasons for Australia’s about-face
on this matter are explored later.
Notwithstanding its delayed
response, Australia received much
credit for leading, and to a large
extent financing, a major regional
security initiative in Solomon Islands.
It is thus unfortunate that Howard
somewhat squandered the resulting
plaudits and goodwill by stating that
he regards ramsi as a template for
Australian-led intervention in other
island microstates should the need
arise. This pronouncement unneces-
sarily alarmed Pacific leaders, who
harbor concerns for sovereignty in the
face of external intervention to rectify
internal governance or security prob-
lems. A state’s sovereignty could not
be more compromised than by an
external force taking control of its
affairs, regardless of that force’s cre-
dentials, multilateral or otherwise.
In 2003, Howard demonstrated an
unprecedented level of involvement in
the Pacific Islands Forum. This con-
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trasted starkly with the prime minis-
ter’s actions during the early years of
Australia’s Coalition government
when he missed three annual meetings
of Forum leaders. The new hands-on
approach was coupled with a series 
of proposals for regional cooperation.
Two initiatives unveiled by Howard
at the Forum were proposals to pool
regional resources in policing (cospon-
sored by Fiji and New Zealand) and
aviation, in order to benefit from
economies of scale, to share expertise,
and to improve the quality of service
in these areas. Forum island leaders
also proposed to investigate the pool-
ing of resources for shipping beyond
those offered by the existing Pacific
Forum Line. Australia agreed to fund
studies to explore all three areas slated
for regional cooperation, including
a$15 million for the regional policing
project and an additional a$12.5 mil-
lion for the Pacific Region hiv/aids
project (pif 2003). Clearly these are
areas in which Forum island members
welcome input, and even leadership,
from Australia, by virtue of its size
and resources.
Often it is not so much the content
of Australia’s agenda for the Pacific
that is objectionable as the attitudes
underpinning it and the way the mes-
sage is delivered. In 2003 Howard
adopted an aggressive style in his pro-
nouncements on the region to the
media and in his direct dealings with
Pacific Island leaders. In terms of pro-
moting good governance, Howard’s
heavy-handed approach diverted
attention from the merits of proposals,
rendering them controversial. Prior to
the Forum meeting he engaged in a
process of agenda building for his
campaign to stamp out corruption in
the islands by overtly threatening to
cut off aid to states that did not com-
ply with Australia’s increased condi-
tionality (The Australian, 26–27 Jul
2003). The message was repeatedly
driven home by reference to the Solo-
mon Islands crisis and how this fate
awaited other microstates if they failed
to get their act together by embracing
Howard’s reform agenda. Adoption
of the Forum Principles of Good
Leadership was clearly designed to
reinforce the Australian focus on
fighting corruption (pif 2003,
Annex 2).
The Australian prime minister’s
new assault on corruption among aid
recipients closely mirrored the
approach adopted by the United
States a year earlier and was no doubt
inspired by that precedent. In March
2002 President George W Bush had
announced a new us$5 billion devel-
opment package to assist developing
countries, to begin in 2004. It fea-
tures strict conditionality, whereby
countries can only qualify for aid
from the newly created Millennium
Challenge Account if they demon-
strate that they are governing justly,
investing in people, and promoting
economic freedom. Minimum require-
ments have been set for governing
justly with reference to civil liberties,
political rights, accountability, rule of
law, and, at the top of the list, control
over corruption (Bush 2002). Aus-
tralia’s approach has not been codi-
fied as systematically as the new US
policy, yet aid conditionality relating
to good governance was certainly
increased in 2003 with regard to
Solomon Islands and Papua New
Guinea. A key condition of aid to
both countries was that they allow an
influx of Australian police and public
servants to facilitate Canberra’s
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desired reforms. In September, 
PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare
attacked this aid conditionality as 
an assault on sovereignty, but he had
little choice, and by December the
first of an estimated 230 police and
60 administrators arrived in Port
Moresby (PM, Jan 2004).
Concerns about Australian neo-
colonialist tendencies are not limited
to safeguarding national sovereignty
but extend to maintaining the integrity
and regional identity of the preemi-
nent intergovernmental organization,
the Pacific Islands Forum. Indeed, the
Forum was founded in 1971 because
the South Pacific Commission was
accurately viewed as the creature of
the colonial powers. The commission
was also unsatisfactory from an
Islander perspective because it pro-
hibited discussion of “political issues”
of profound concern for the Pacific
Islands, including nuclear testing and
decolonization. Islanders were under-
standably apprehensive about the
inclusion of Australia and New
Zealand in the Forum, but they
believed that the benefits outweighed
the potential costs. To some extent,
their concerns have been vindicated.
On many occasions Australia has
reined in regional antinuclear and
anticolonial initiatives. Since John
Howard’s coalition government came
to power, it has toned down regional
statements concerning climate change,
nuclear waste shipments, and West
Papua.
In 2003, Howard’s aggressive
approach was further evidenced in his
flouting of two long-standing tradi-
tions in the Forum. First, he put for-
ward an Australian candidate for the
position of Forum secretary-general.
It has been an established and cher-
ished convention, at least for Island
members, that this office be filled by 
a Pacific Islander. The second break
with tradition was precipitated by the
first, because Howard was unable to
gain a consensus agreement in sup-
port of his candidate, former diplomat
Greg Urwin. New Zealand then lent
support to Australia’s campaign and
their combined lobbying brought
enormous pressure to bear on Island
leaders. As a result, an unprecedented
secret ballot determined the Austral-
ian as the winning candidate. This
move was coupled with an agreement
to review the Forum and its Secre-
tariat, the results of which would be
implemented by the new secretary-
general in 2004 (pif 2003, paragraphs
58–59).
After the Forum meeting Howard
added insult to injury by proclaiming,
“This body is seen as having new
authority, new relevance and every-
body will go from this meeting feeling
that they’re part of something that
will punch even harder and more
effectively in the region than before”
(IB, Sep 2003). The less-than-diplo-
matic implication of his statement
was that Pacific Islanders had been
incapable of running the Forum effec-
tively and that Urwin’s undertaking 
a shake-up of the Secretariat would
remedy the situation. Howard also
proclaimed triumphantly that this
meeting of the Forum was a “water-
shed,” with the subtext that Australia
had succeeded in imposing its agenda
(IB, Sep 2003). Regional responses to
Howard’s domination of the Forum
were summed up in the headlines of
Islands Business magazine: “Austra-
lia’s Regional Push Risks a Backlash:
Pacific Way Kicked to a Side Street
called History”; “Howard Hits with
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Heavy Hands;” and “Lording Over
the Pacific: Australia’s John Howard’s
Push into the Region” (IB, Sep 2003).
Moreover, Island leaders warned the
incoming secretary-general: “You must
focus your approach on making sure
that . . . the developmental aspects of
the region remain the priority and not
Australia’s programmes” (IB, Sep
2003). The Australian prime minister’s
rhetoric and disproportionate influ-
ence on Forum decisions are signifi-
cant as they indicate that Pacific
Island members are losing control 
of their Forum. The Forum may also
lessen its clout on an international
level if it loses its regional identity 
and is perceived as a vehicle for
Australian foreign policy.
This begs the question of why
Howard has adopted an aggressive
interventionist approach to the region
after showing such indifference in the
late 1990s. When Howard came to
power in 1996 he expressed relatively
little interest in the Asia Pacific region
in general, much less the Pacific
Islands, but this changed with the
1999 Australian-led international
peacekeeping operation in East Timor
(interfet). Howard’s interest then
broadened to a global perspective
following the terrorist attack on the
United States in September 2001 and
the ensuing “war on terror.” The Bali
terrorist attack in 2002, which
resulted in the deaths of eighty-eight
Australians, prompted greater atten-
tion to islands in the Pacific. The close
alliance with the United States also
inspired Australia to play “deputy
sheriff” in the Asia-Pacific region.
While this self-appointed role did 
not wash with Southeast Asian states,
Pacific Islands had little choice but to
accept it. Prime Minister Howard 
was emboldened by Australia’s role 
in East Timor, Bougainville, and even
Iraq, as well as by the invitation to
lead a force in Solomon Islands.
However, being invited to intervene
in a state in crisis does not mean that
Australia is welcome to dictate the
future of other microstates, much 
less the region as a whole.
Australia and the United States
currently share a preoccupation with
the threat of terrorism. In turn, their
newfound concern with weak states
stems from the belief that these are
vulnerable to exploitation by inter-
national criminals, notably terrorists.
Australia’s 2003 white paper on for-
eign policy highlighted security con-
cerns in the Pacific. Under the heading
“The South Pacific Matters to Aus-
tralia,” the report stated: “Instability
in the South Pacific affects our ability
to protect large and significant
approaches to Australia. . . . trans-
national crime in and through the
region—terrorism, drug trafficking,
people smuggling, illegal immigration
and money laundering—is a growing
threat to Australia and the South
Pacific countries themselves” (dfat
2003, 93). Solomon Islands in partic-
ular was portrayed as a “petri dish in
which transnational and non-state
security threats can develop and
breed” (aspi 2003, 13). This concern
was highlighted by Prime Minister
Howard: “We know that a failed state
on our doorstep will jeopardise our
own security” (The Australian, 2 Jul
2003). In a reflection of shared con-
cerns, US Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage praised Australia’s
intervention in Solomon Islands, not-
ing that “We realise that failed states
can reach out and touch us badly”
(The Australian, 13 Aug 2003).
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Whereas the end of the cold war
signaled the declining strategic rele-
vance of Pacific microstates for great
powers, the “war on terror” has
reversed this trend.
Apart from propping up weak
states, this interest in bolstering Pacific
Islands’ security against terrorism has
focused on money laundering, iden-
tity fraud, flags of convenience for
ships, and border protection. In
March 2002 Australia, with the
United States and New Zealand,
sponsored a counter-terrorism work-
shop for the Pacific Islands. The year
before, the international community
launched measures to combat the
financing of terrorism, notably United
Nations Security Council Resolution
1373 (unsc 2001), and the eight
special measures recommended by 
the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (fatf 2001). In
keeping with these initiatives, the
Forum adopted the 2002 Nasonini
Declaration on Regional Security
(pif 2002, Annex 1) and subsequently
began to develop a regional frame-
work featuring model legislative
provisions to address terrorism and
transnational organized crime (pif
2003, paragraph 17). At the 2003
Forum, leaders also agreed to explore
the scope for Forum members to join
the international Identity Fraud Regis-
ter project (pif 2003, paragraph 25). 
Australia has led these regional
efforts, including a joint campaign 
by regional police chiefs to prevent
money laundering and increase bor-
der protection. A four-day meeting on
this issue was hosted and chaired by
Australia in November. At that time
Australian Federal Police Commis-
sioner Mick Keelty reiterated the risk
that Pacific Islands could be used by
terrorists as “staging points to com-
mit crimes not only in Australia, but
in other countries” (The Australian,
25 Nov 2003). In addition, Australia
has provided countries in the region
with assistance including education 
in counter-terrorism investigation to
improve their response during terror-
ist attacks; training to combat money
laundering; and guidance in drafting
counter-terrorism legislation (dfat
2003, 39). Australian aid has also
focused on strengthening law enforce-
ment and border security.
Clearly, combating terrorism is of
concern to the international commu-
nity, not least the United States and
Australia, which are prime targets 
for future attacks. The Pacific Islands
share these concerns in a general
sense and have agreed on measures 
to prevent terrorists from exploiting
their weaknesses. However, terrorism
is considered a more peripheral threat
for most Pacific Island states and
their inhabitants. It is hardly conceiv-
able that terrorists could set up oper-
ations without detection in these small
communities. Indeed, the only place
where groups with terrorist links have
taken up residence is in the Indone-
sian province of West Papua. Con-
cerns over Laskar Jihad and its con-
nections with Jemaah Islamiyah have
repeatedly been voiced by Papua New
Guinea but to date have not been
heeded by Australia (The Australian,
8–9 Feb 2003). Instead, the main
threat faced by the microstates in the
current climate is that if they fail to
comply with antiterrorist measures,
they will incur sanctions including
conditions on, or even cuts to, aid.
This has already happened in the case
of Nauru, which was placed under
enormous pressure by the United
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States to abolish its offshore banking
and passport schemes in 2003 (The
Australian, 2–3 Aug 2003).
Surely Pacific Islanders can be for-
given for being cynical about renewed
interest in their region. Just as the
cold war saw allies employing the
policy of strategic denial in the Pacific,
so too the new war on terror has seen
external powers, notably Australia
and the United States, seek to deny
terrorists the use of this region for
diverse illegal activities. Due in large
part to its own national security
concerns, Australia has deepened 
its engagement with the region and
adopted a more assertive approach in
pushing its agenda, both at the Forum
and in bilateral relations. The key
question for the Pacific Islands is
whether the focus on a fairly narrow
conception of security will detract
attention from what the region per-
ceives as paramount problems. Terror-
ism poses far less of a threat to liveli-
hood in the Pacific (or elsewhere for
that matter) than the projected impact
of climate change, the depletion of
fish stocks, or the inexorable spread
of hiv/aids. By the same token,
Islanders are concerned that donor
preoccupations with narrow concep-
tions of good governance, currently
focused on corruption, not be pur-
sued at the expense of long-term
strategies to promote sustainable
development.
The Australian government should
note the recommendations of its Sen-
ate committee and ensure that its
Pacific policies reflect regional con-
cerns and are not driven solely by
Australia’s national interest and cur-
rent preoccupations. Australia should
not be deterred from deeper engage-
ment with the region for fear of being
charged with neocolonialism. Yet for
its diplomacy to be effective, Australia
must be mindful that the postcolonial
states are sensitive to incursions on
their sovereignty and, by extension,
the hijacking of their Forum. John
Howard’s approach is thus counter-
productive to his ostensible aims. 
An insensitive and domineering style
alienates the leaders whose coopera-
tion is needed to implement reforms.
It is accepted wisdom in the aid com-
munity that if people are not con-
sulted and involved in determining
new policies, those policies will be
resisted or simply ignored. In recent
years Australia has repeatedly
imposed its agenda concerning issues
of good governance and security at
the Forum by virtue of its status as
the prime aid donor as well as by
exploiting Pacific cultural protocols 
of seeking consensus. Howard may 
be able to coerce superficial accep-
tance of his agenda at the Forum, but
it is doomed to fail if genuine support
is lacking.
Albeit on a smaller stage, the
Australian prime minister appears 
to be emulating President Bush’s
uncompromising unilateralist foreign
policy infused with a heavy dose of
realism. Just as the United States is ill
served by the Bush administration’s
cavalier attitude toward multilateral
institutions and international opinion,
Australia’s reputation and influence in
the Pacific could also suffer due to
Howard’s heavy-handed treatment of
microstates and the Forum as a whole.
Both the US and Australian govern-
ments would do well to remember
that lasting influence is derived from
legitimacy and persuasive diplomacy.
Regardless of the content of Austra-
lia’s Pacific policies, if the process and
political reviews • the region 381
rhetoric are perceived as illegitimate,
it will undermine their effectiveness in
the region.
karin von strokirch
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